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Notes
PREVENTING DEFENDANTS FROM
MOOTING CLASS ACTIONS BY
PICKING OFF NAMED PLAINTIFFS
DAVID HILL KOYSZA
These rules . . . shall be construed and administered to secure the
1
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.

INTRODUCTION
Federal rules are adopted for specific purposes. Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class action rule, was adopted
to enable courts to resolve the similar claims of numerous plaintiffs in
2
a single action. This Note spotlights and criticizes a threat to the
function of the class action device. The threat takes the shape of a full
offer of judgment, conveyed by class action defendants to named
plaintiffs before class certification, intended to force mootness upon
plaintiffs and prevent them from employing the class action device.
The practice has been labeled by many courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, as the “picking off” of named plaintiffs.3 An
already significant and growing number of federal district courts have
Copyright © 2003 by David Hill Koysza.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1937) (explaining that Rule 23
represented an adoption of Equity Rule 38, which empowered courts to resolve claims “of
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court”). References in this Note to Rule 23 reflect the
recent amendments to the Rule, effective December 2003.
3. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (lamenting the
fact that named plaintiffs’ claims “effectively could be ‘picked off’ by a defendant’s tender of
judgment”); Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 2003) (bestowing the
same “picking off” label upon the practice of settling with the named plaintiff to moot the class
action); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 982 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); Wilson v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 671 F.2d 673, 679 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Satterwhite v. City of
Greenville, 634 F.2d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1981) (Gee, J., dissenting) (same).
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held that such offers of judgment, if conveyed before the class is
certified, and if consisting of the full amount of damages that each
named plaintiff could possibly recover in the action, render the
named plaintiffs’ claims moot, requiring dismissal of the entire class
4
action. Because these decisions have not required that named
plaintiffs actually accept the full offer of judgment—according to
many courts, the mere fact that a full offer was made available is
sufficient to moot the action—defendants are thereby granted the
ability to force dismissal of the putative class action, stripping
otherwise qualified plaintiffs of the ability to fully employ the class
action device. This Note argues that bestowing such a “secret
weapon”5 upon defendants both thwarts the function of the class
action device and vitiates the policies behind it.
This argument rests on a fundamental assumption—that class
actions are a good thing, useful enough to be worth preserving. To be
sure, the class action device has not gone uncriticized. Commentators
and courts have bemoaned the disconnect that often arises between
class action lawyers and the class members whom they purport to
6
represent. The pages of reputable journals and reporters are filled
with descriptions of “litigation-mad, bottom-feeding, money-hungry,
7
professional plaintiffs’ lawyers.” Jurists so eminent as Henry Friendly
4. See infra Part II (discussing the split that has emerged among the district courts on this
issue).
5. Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action Cases: Do Defendants
Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 283, 283 (2000) (referring to the offer of
judgment as a class action defendant’s “secret weapon”). A somewhat less sinister label might
be the “[s]ubtle [w]eapon.” See Ian H. Fisher, Federal Rule 68, a Defendant’s Subtle Weapon: Its
Use and Pitfalls, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 89, 89 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d 677,
678 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (“Class actions differ from ordinary lawsuits in that the lawyers
for the class, rather than the clients, have all the initiative and are close to being the real parties
in interest. This fundamental departure from the traditional pattern in Anglo-American
litigation generates a host of problems . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1995) (“[I]ndividual plaintiffs have
weak to nonexistent control over their attorneys across the mass tort context for reasons that
are inherent to the economics of mass tort litigation.”). For a fascinating and lively discussion of
the ethical implications arising from this disconnect, see Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994). Weinstein suggests that, on the whole,
“there is reason to criticize and praise everyone involved in these cases.” Id. at 472.
7. Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We’ll Settle in Bunches:
Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1997); see also
Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 180 (2001) (“Many ordinary
Americans seem to think that class actions are a new-fangled litigation device invented by
greedy plaintiff attorneys.”).
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and Richard Posner warn that unscrupulous plaintiffs can leverage
the class action device to extract “blackmail settlements” from
8
9
defendants. Newspapers ridicule the frivolous claims and exorbitant
10
attorneys’ fees so often associated with class actions.
Yet even the harshest class action critics cannot completely
11
dismiss the social policies facilitated by the class action device. By
allowing numerous plaintiffs who meet Rule 23’s prerequisites to pool
their resources into a single litigation, thereby spreading the costs of
litigation among many participants,12 properly certified class actions
“overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or
her rights.”13 The class action device has been described as “a complex
machinery capable of rectifying huge wrongs spread amongst millions
of people who, standing alone, would lack both the incentive and the
ability to act with such curative effect.”14 Rather than relying on the
government as the sole protector of individual rights, citizens who
meet the prerequisites of Rule 23 can themselves use class actions to
act as “private attorneys general,”15 preventing discrimination and

8. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.)
(quoting Judge Friendly, who, according to Judge Posner, “was not given to hyperbole”);
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Shannon Brownlee, Portion Distortion: You Don’t Know the Half of It, WASH.
POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at B5 (describing a class action against McDonald’s filed by a mother who
claimed that she “always believed McDonald’s food was healthy for [her] son”).
10. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Coughing It Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, § 7, at 17
(commenting upon the “troublesome knots in the logic behind the litigation that [tobacco class
action plaintiffs’ attorney Ron] Motley led, which is scheduled to earn his small firm in
Charleston, S.C., more than $1 billion in fees”).
11. See Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule
23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 837 (2000) (concisely setting forth
the policy goals facilitated by class actions).
12. See id. (“By spreading the costs of litigation across a class, a greater number of litigants
are able to pool their resources in an effort to vindicate their rights.”).
13. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
14. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 402–
03 (2003) (quoting Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951 (E.D. Tex.
2000)); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1419, 1419 (2003) (“The class action has many uses. The most compelling occurs when someone
inflicts a small harm on each member of a large group of people.”).
15. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 250
(1988) (“[A] different way to prevent law enforcement officials from committing repeated
violations of constitutional rights is for a plaintiff to file a civil rights suit, seeking to establish
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effecting broad social change. As a result, properly certified class
actions have become a significant means by which to implement some
16
of the nation’s most important civil rights legislation. Simply put by
Justice William O. Douglas, the class action is “one of the few legal
remedies the small claimant has against those who command the
status quo.”17
This Note does not join the debate over the merits of the class
action device. Instead, it assumes that the class action device exists to
be used, and that Rule 23 should be interpreted, as the federal rules
prescribe, “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
18
of every action.” Part I of this Note discusses the somewhat tortured
relationship between Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the class
action device,19 highlighting the Supreme Court’s application of
mootness principles in the class action context. Part II describes in
detail the practice of picking off named plaintiffs, and surveys the
treatment of the issue by lower federal courts, a significant number of
which have endorsed the practice. Part III sets forth four specific
reasons why defendants should be prevented from mooting class
actions by picking off named plaintiffs. Part IV considers existing
tactical and scholarly proposals to prevent this practice, and advances
a new, better theory to ensure that the class action device remains
available to plaintiffs whose claims satisfy the prerequisites of
Rule 23.

that equitable relief is needed to prevent future violations, even if the risk of harm to the
individual plaintiff is minute.”).
16. See John W. Welch, Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions
Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 573 n.2 (observing that the
class action device has been vital to enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
17. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
19. As one commentator has observed, “[a]pplication of the mootness doctrine to class
actions has confounded the Justices of the United States Supreme Court.” Richard K.
Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class Actions, 35 STAN. L. REV. 897,
897 (1983).
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I. ARTICLE III AND THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE
A. The Anatomy of a Class Action
In the class action context, named plaintiffs have the burden of
pleading facts that bring the action within the rubric of Rule 23.20
Every proposed class action must satisfy the four, well-known
prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a): numerosity,21 commonality,22
typicality,23 and adequacy of representation.24 Additionally, named
plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claims fall within one of the
three categories of Rule 23(b).25 The true transformation of a class
action begins with the class certification motion, at which point the
court determines whether the named plaintiffs have met all the
requirements to maintain a class action. Rule 23(c)(1)(A) provides
that “[w]hen a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the
court must—at an early practicable time—determine by order
whether to certify the action as a class action.”26 Any party to the
litigation, as well as the court acting sua sponte, may initiate the
27
certification process. If the court finds that the requirements of Rule
23 are met, it may grant the motion for class certification.28
Practice under Rule 23(c) gives the court flexibility in
determining the appropriate time to consider the issue of class
certification. As Professors Conte and Newberg observe, “there are
no formal procedures or timetables leading to an initial class
29
determination.” The rule merely requires that “at an early

20. See 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:16, at
64 (4th ed. 2002). For a concise summary of class action requirements, see Sharkey, supra note
14, at 403 n.201.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
27. 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:6, at 17–18.
28. See 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.04, at 23-28 to -29 (3d ed. 2003) (“The Fourth
Circuit has held that a district court’s broad discretion is not limited to making mere factual
determinations as to whether the four Rule 23(a) criteria are met. If these criteria are met, an
action ‘may,’ not ‘must,’ be maintained as a class action. If other factors militate against trying
the case as a class action, it is appropriate for a district court to refuse to certify, or to decertify,
the class.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 758 (4th
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999)).
29. 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:5, at 17.
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30
practicable time” the court shall consider the issue. Some courts
have promulgated local rules that establish a specific time period
within which a named plaintiff must file a class certification motion.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for example, plaintiffs must
file certification motions within ninety days of filing the complaint.31
In the Southern District of New York, the deadline is sixty days after
filing the complaint.32 In jurisdictions that do not have local rules
governing the timing of certification motions, the timing of such
33
motions varies greatly with each case. As a result, certification
rulings “have been made as early as a few months following the filing
of the complaint and as late as several years thereafter.”34

B. Article III in the Class Action Context
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts to actual “cases” or “controversies”
between parties.35 When an individual plaintiff loses her so-called
“personal stake” in the litigation, the requisite case or controversy no
longer exists, and the court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim.36 One way in which the plaintiff can lose her personal
stake in the litigation is for the defendant to surrender all that the
37
plaintiff is seeking in the action. If the defendant conveys a full offer
of judgment to the plaintiff, the plaintiff no longer has anything to
38
gain in the litigation, and the case must be dismissed as moot. As

30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
31. E.D. PA. R. 27, cited in 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:6, at 21.
32. S.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 11A(c), cited in 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:6, at 21.
33. See 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:14, at 47 (“When the cases are examined,
one finds that each suit has its own case history and surrounding circumstances that affect the
practicabilities of reaching an initial class determination.”).
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
37. See, e.g., Greisz v. Household Bank (Illinois), N.A., 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Such an offer, by giving the plaintiff the equivalent of a default judgment . . . , eliminates a
legal dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based.”); Holstein v. City of Chicago, 29
F.3d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Once the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiff’s entire
demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and a plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge
this loses outright, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), because he has no remaining stake.” (quoting
Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991)) (citations omitted)); cf. Deposit Guar.
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (“Nor does a confession of judgment by
defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire case; other issues in the case may be
appealable.”).
38. See cases cited supra note 37.
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tersely distilled by Judge Posner, “[y]ou cannot persist in suing after
39
you’ve won.”
But what if the plaintiff is suing not only on behalf of herself, but
also on behalf of “all those similarly situated,” as is the case with class
40
actions? In such cases, even if the named plaintiff loses her personal
stake in the litigation, there remains a recognizable group of
persons—the putative class members—on the opposite side of the “v”
from the defendants, sufficient to provide the requisite case or
controversy under Article III.
Or does there? The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the
question of at what point in the life of a class action the separate and
distinct interests of putative class members alone are sufficient to
maintain a class action, even if the claims of the named plaintiffs have
become moot. In a line of decisions that are, by the Court’s own
41
42
admission, “somewhat confusing” and at times “irreconcilable,” the
Court has carved out several class action exceptions to the traditional
43
doctrines of standing and mootness. Although these decisions do not
deal directly with the practice of picking off named plaintiffs, they
provide important foundation for understanding the implications of
Article III for this practice.
44
First, in Sosna v. Iowa, the Court held that a class action, once
properly certified, may proceed even after a named plaintiff’s claim is
45
rendered moot. This is justified, according to the Court, because a
properly certified class “acquire[s] a legal status separate from the

39. Greisz, 176 F.3d at 1015.
40. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 121 (1973) (noting that one set of plaintiffs sued
“on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated”).
41. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.11 (1980).
42. Id.
43. For a concise summary of the class action exceptions to the mootness doctrine, see the
Rosetta Stone of all things jurisdictional, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §
2.5.5 (4th ed. 2003). In addition to the class action exceptions, brief attention is warranted here
to the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception, which may appear to dispose of the
issue in this Note. That exception allows litigation of a moot issue if the issue is (1) “of a type
likely to happen to the plaintiff again,” and (2) “of inherently limited duration so that it is likely
to always become moot before federal court litigation is completed.” Id. § 2.5.3, at 132.
Although named plaintiffs’ claims are rendered “of inherently limited duration” by a
defendant’s willingness to settle with the plaintiffs seriatim, see infra Part IV.C, this exception is
inapplicable because the defendant’s settlement offer makes it impossible for the same claims to
arise again with respect to the same named plaintiffs, see id. (“[T]here must be a reasonable
chance that it will happen again to the plaintiff.”).
44. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
45. Id. at 401.
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46
interest asserted by [the named plaintiff].” Second, in United
47
Airlines v. McDonald, the Court held that a member of the putative
class may intervene to appeal the denial of class certification, even if
48
the named plaintiff’s claim has become moot. In so holding, the
Court again recognized that the interests of putative class members
49
are distinct from those of named plaintiffs. Third, in Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper50 and United States Parole
Commission v. Geraghty51—both decided on the same day—the Court
held that a named plaintiff in a putative class action may herself
appeal the denial of class certification, even if her substantive claim
has become moot.52 This exception is justified, according to the Court,
by the named plaintiff’s continuing interest in sharing the costs of
53
litigation with members of the putative class. These decisions make
clear that after the trial court has entertained the class certification
motion, a class action can proceed even if the named plaintiff’s claim
is rendered moot.54 Finally, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,55
the Court held that putative class actions—that is, actions in which
the class has not yet been certified by the court—may continue after
the named plaintiff’s claim is rendered moot, if the nature of the
named plaintiff’s claim is “so inherently transitory that the trial court

46. Id. at 399.
47. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
48. Id. at 393–95.
49. Id. at 393–94.
50. 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
51. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
52. Roper, 445 U.S. at 340; Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404.
53. Roper, 445 U.S. at 336; Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402–03. The Court in Roper also sought to
prevent defendants from being able to “buy off” named plaintiffs before their appeals are fully
resolved. 445 U.S. at 339.
54. As this paragraph indicates, the Court’s decisions in this area appear to take a
somewhat flexible approach in applying the mootness doctrine to class action litigation. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, § 2.5.5. This approach is not without tension with regard to
several decisions by the Court that appear to require a rigid application of the mootness
doctrine in other contexts. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430–
31 (1976) (stating that, but for the intervention of the United States, the case would have been
moot because all plaintiffs had graduated from the school system and the case had not been
certified as a class action); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (holding a former
prisoner’s non-class action claim against the Parole Commission to be moot because there was
no “reasonable expectation” that the plaintiff would again be subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction); Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975) (declaring students’ claim
against the Board of School Commissioners to be moot because the students had already
graduated from high school and because the case had not been properly certified by the district
court as a class action).
55. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class
certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest
56
expires.”
In light of the flexibility with which the Court has applied the
mootness doctrine in the class action context, it would seem plausible
that federal courts would take an equally expansive approach when
addressing cases involving efforts by defendants to pick off named
plaintiffs at the outset of class actions. As the next Part illustrates,
however, this has not been the case.
II. PICKING OFF NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a
mechanism by which defendants can convey offers of judgment to
plaintiffs, giving plaintiffs the choice between accepting the offer
within ten days of its conveyance, or rejecting the offer and agreeing
to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs should the amount
57
obtained at trial be less than the amount set forth in the offer. The
primary purposes of Rule 68 are to encourage settlement and
58
discourage frivolous or protracted litigation. However, class action
defendants have embraced the Rule 68 mechanism for a different
purpose: thwarting class action litigation. In a growing trend already
endorsed by a significant number of federal courts, defendants are
conveying Rule 68 offers of judgment for the full amount claimed by
named plaintiffs, and then filing motions to dismiss on the ground
that, in light of the full offer, the plaintiffs no longer have a personal
stake in the litigation.59

56. Id. at 52 (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399) (emphasis added).
57. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the
offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
58. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Offer of Judgment, in 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
68.02[2], at 68-7 (3d ed. 2003) (“The primary purpose of Rule 68 is to promote settlements and
avoid protracted litigation.”).
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (allowing motions to dismiss for “lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter”).
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The practice of picking off named plaintiffs in this manner
requires precise timing. Because of the Supreme Court’s willingness
to allow properly certified class actions to continue even after the
60
named plaintiff’s claim is rendered moot, the full offer of judgment
must certainly be conveyed before the class is certified by the trial
court. Several courts of appeals, however, have moved the mark to an
earlier point in the action, holding that the separate and distinct
interests of the putative class are implicated not only upon proper
certification of the class, but also upon filing of a class certification
motion with the court.61 Thus, under the decisions of the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals, in order to have any effect upon the
justiciability of the class action as a whole, offers of judgment must be
conveyed before the named plaintiff files the class certification
motion.
Only one court of appeals has weighed in on the effect of full
offers of judgment conveyed before the class certification motion is
62
filed. In Colbert v. Dymacol, Inc., a Third Circuit panel issued a
temporarily crushing blow to the class action plaintiffs’ bar. Rejecting
the argument that “because [the] litigation was filed as a class action,
typical mootness rules [did] not apply,” the panel held that when a
defendant makes a full offer of judgment to a named plaintiff before a
motion for class certification is filed, the litigation becomes moot and
a court no longer has jurisdiction over the matter.63 Plaintiffs’
attorneys breathed a sigh of relief, however, when the Third Circuit,

60. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397–403 (1975) (permitting the plaintiff to maintain
her class action challenge of Iowa’s residency requirement for divorce even though she had
satisfied the residency requirement since filing the claim).
61. See, e.g., Phillips v. Allegheny County, 869 F.2d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A]n action
filed as a class action should be treated as if certification has been granted for the purposes of
settlement until certification is denied.”); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 869 (7th
Cir. 1978) (“We consider the motion for certification, while pending, as sufficiently, though
provisionally, bringing the interests of class members before the court [to] avoid a mootness
artificially created by the defendant . . . .”), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Roper v. Consurve,
Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1978) (“By the very act of filing a class action, the class
representatives assume responsibilities to members of the class.”), aff’d sub nom. Deposit Guar.
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). But see Hechenberger v. W. Elec. Co., 742 F.2d 453,
455 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that where there is no evidence that the claims would otherwise
evade review, dismissal is required when the plaintiff’s claim is mooted before class
certification), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985).
62. No. 01-4397, 2002 WL 1974538 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2002).
63. Colbert, 2002 WL 1974538, at *2.
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64
sitting en banc, vacated and ultimately dismissed on an unrelated
65
procedural issue the Colbert decision.
Lacking further guidance from the Supreme Court or the courts
of appeals, the federal district courts are sharply divided over the
effect of full offers conveyed before the named plaintiff files the
certification motion. Two expressly contradictory approaches have
emerged, each with its staunch adherents. Characteristic of the first
66
approach is Ambalu v. Rosenblatt. In Ambalu, a district court in the
Eastern District of New York addressed a situation in which the
defendant, a debt collection agency, attempted to short-circuit a class
action brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA)67 by serving on the named plaintiff an offer of judgment
pursuant to Rule 68. The offer consisted of the maximum damages
that the named plaintiff could recover under the Act ($1,000), and it
was conveyed before the named plaintiff filed a motion for class
certification.68 Acknowledging that the defendant had “offered all
that Ambalu could hope to recover through this litigation,” the court
69
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
70
Numerous other district courts have since followed this reasoning.
The opposite approach is well represented by Liles v. American
71
Corrective Counseling Services, Inc. In Liles, the district court for the
Southern District of Iowa faced precisely the same fact pattern as that
faced by the court in Ambalu. The defendant, another debt collection
agency, served a Rule 68 offer upon the named plaintiff in a class
72
action brought under the FDCPA and its state law counterpart. The
offer consisted of full statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 for
each claim, and it was conveyed before the named plaintiff filed a

64. 305 F.3d 1256, 1256 (3d Cir. 2002).
65. 344 F.3d 334, 334 (3d Cir. 2003).
66. 194 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
68. Ambalu, 194 F.R.D. at 452.
69. Id. at 453.
70. See, e.g., Edge v. C. Tech Collections, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“This
Court joins Judges McMahon and Glasser in wholeheartedly agreeing with the sound reasoning
of Judge Nickerson in Ambalu.”); Tratt v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., No. 00-CV4560(ILG), 2001 WL 667602, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001) (“I simply adopt Judge Nickerson’s
opinion [in Ambalu] as being entirely dispositive here . . . .”); Wilner v. OSI Collection Servs.,
Inc., 198 F.R.D. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Nickerson’s
reasoning.”), modified, 201 F.R.D. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
71. 201 F.R.D. 452 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
72. Id. at 453–54.

KOYSZA.DOC

792

06/21/04 4:00 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:781

73
class certification motion. After first acknowledging the Ambalu
74
decision, the court expressly rejected that decision’s reasoning and
75
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court explained very
directly its basis for rejecting the reasoning in Ambalu:

[The named plaintiff] filed this action as a class action. As such, she
has assumed a responsibility to members of the putative class and
this Court has a special responsibility to protect their interests,
regardless of whether a motion for class certification has been filed.
Hinging the outcome of this motion on whether or not class
certification has been filed is not well-supported in the law nor
sound judicial practice; it would encourage a “race to pay off”
named plaintiffs very early in litigation, before they file motions for
76
class certification.

Numerous other district courts have reached the same conclusion as
that reached in Liles, precluding defendants from short-circuiting
77
class actions by picking off named plaintiffs at the outset.
III. WHY DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM
PICKING OFF NAMED PLAINTIFFS
This Note began with an assumption—that class actions exist to
be used, and that practices which would thwart class actions should be
78
prevented. Courts and commentators alike have recognized the
destructive effect on the class action device of the practice of picking
73. The offer also included compensation for reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. at
454.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 455.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Nasca v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 01CIV10127(DLC), 2002 WL 31040647, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (refusing to dismiss the case as moot but finding for the defendant
on the merits); Bond v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., No. CIV.A. 01-177L, 2002 WL 373475, at *5
(D.R.I. Feb. 21, 2002) (precluding the defendant from rendering the case moot by making an
offer of judgment six days after the filing of the complaint); White v. OSI Collection Servs., Inc.,
No. 01-CV-1343(ARR), 2001 WL 1590518, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001) (precluding the
defendant from picking off the plaintiff by serving an offer of judgment the day after the
plaintiff filed her complaint); Crisci v. Shalala, 169 F.R.D. 563, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]his
Court must consider the potential ability of defendants to purposefully moot the named
plaintiffs’ claims after the class action complaint has been filed but before the class has been
properly certified.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goetz v. Crosson, 728 F. Supp. 995,
999–1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that the defendant could not “purposefully moot the
named plaintiffs’ claims” before certification of the class), summary judgment granted on merits,
769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), remanded, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
78. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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off named plaintiffs. For example, Chief Justice Burger, certainly not
79
known for liberally construing Article III limitations, nevertheless
remarked in dicta that the practice of picking off named plaintiffs
80
“obviously would frustrate the objectives of class actions.” Another
federal judge recently declared that the practice of picking off named
81
plaintiffs “would render the class action mechanisms a nullity.”
Apart from these general admonitions, this Part considers four
specific reasons why defendants should be prevented from picking off
named plaintiffs.
A. Depriving Plaintiffs of the Motivation and Ability to Employ the
Class Action Device
Allowing defendants to moot class actions at their outset
deprives many plaintiffs of both the motivation and the practical
ability to bring their claims. As discussed at the outset of this Note,
class actions have evolved into something more significant than
82
merely a procedural device. By allowing numerous plaintiffs to pool
their resources and collaborate in a single litigation, class actions
provide a vehicle with which to effect broad social change.83 The
prospect of a full-scale movement against a defendant may motivate
the filing of some lawsuits by plaintiffs who otherwise would have
thought their individual claims too petty to pursue.84 Moreover, even
absent the motivation of social change, class actions alleviate costs
that might otherwise prohibit individual plaintiffs from seeking relief.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that plaintiffs have a genuine
interest, distinct from the interest in resolving their substantive
claims, in ultimately “shift[ing] part of the costs of litigation to those

79. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (Burger, C.J.)
(dismissing for lack of standing a taxpayer’s suit challenging the constitutionality of keeping
secret the spending records of the Central Intelligence Agency); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3,
15 (1972) (Burger, C.J.) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a class action alleging that plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights were being chilled by the mere “existence and operation of the intelligence
gathering and distributing system, which [was] confined to the Army and related civilian
investigative agencies”).
80. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
81. Bond, 2002 WL 373475, at *6.
82. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text.
83. As noted in the Introduction, class actions have been a significant vehicle for
implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Welch, supra note 16, at 573 n.2.
84. Roper, 445 U.S. at 338 (observing that class actions have played a great role “in
vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to
embark on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by the cost”).
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who will share in its benefits if the class is certified and ultimately
85
prevails.” Without the ability to share costs with other class
members that the class action device provides, smaller claims might
be swallowed up by the costs of litigation. Yet by conveying full offers
of judgment upon individual named plaintiffs before the certification
motion is filed, defendants attempt to deprive the court of subject
matter jurisdiction before the issue of certification can even be
entertained. This practice is capable of dissuading would-be plaintiffs
from even attempting to file a claim.
B. Creating an Unnecessary Multiplicity of Suits
As one commentator observes, “Rule 68 permits a defendant
who may be liable to thousands of potential class members for
nominal claims to ‘pick-off’ every would-be class representative,
forever delaying adjudication of the class claims.”86 Allowing
defendants to pick off named plaintiffs seriatim contravenes the very
purpose for which class actions were created—to provide a
mechanism to resolve the claims of numerous plaintiffs in a single
action.87 Such practice also contravenes one of the central purposes
for the adoption of Rule 68—to avoid unnecessary and protracted
88
litigation. Rather than resolving claims in a single action, defendants
who pick off named plaintiffs show their willingness to litigate
identical claims in separate actions ad infinitum. “This would
contravene the basic policy of class action practice which is to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.”89 Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger remarked in
90
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, allowing defendants to
moot class actions strategically “would invite waste of judicial
resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming
aggrievement.”91 The more efficient practice—and indeed the practice
envisioned by the drafters of Rule 2392—is to prevent defendants from

85. Id. at 336. This interest became the basis of the Court’s decision in finding that the
named plaintiffs retained a personal stake in the litigation and thus could appeal the trial court’s
denial of class certification even after the defendant had conveyed upon them full offers of
judgment. Id. at 340.
86. Fisher, supra note 5, at 115.
87. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89. Welch, supra note 16, at 580 n.29.
90. 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
91. Id. at 339.
92. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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thwarting class actions that otherwise meet the prerequisites set forth
in Rule 23.
C. Creating an Unnecessary Race to the Courthouse
If the survival of the class action hinges on whether the
defendant’s offer is conveyed before or after the certification motion
93
is filed, both defendants and plaintiffs have great motivation to file
Rule 68 offers or class certification motions as quickly as possible. On
its face, this might seem like a benefit, in that it would result in the
expeditious resolution of certification issues. But hinging the court’s
jurisdiction on who can get to the courthouse first does nothing but
create a race between the parties to file documents with the court.
Taking this to its logical (and foreseeable) extreme, named plaintiffs
would be required to file class certification motions concurrently with
the complaint in order to prevent a Rule 68 offer from reaching them
first.94
Such concurrent filing would be contrary to sound judicial
administration. First, the federal rules do not contemplate the
immediate filing of the certification motion, requiring instead that the
95
court consider the issue merely “at an early practicable time.”
Though some courts have set definite time periods within which the
certification motion must be filed, none of these deadlines includes
96
“immediately.” Second, discovery may be necessary to define
properly the class.97 Though class certification motions are often
98
decided based upon the pleadings, the certification decision should
generally be made with more information than what is alleged in the
pleadings.99 Courts may, in their discretion, grant permission for
limited “class discovery” on the issues necessary to decide
100
Allowing named plaintiffs time to prepare the
certification.
93. See supra notes 60–77 and accompanying text.
94. See Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., 200 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(warning that such a rule “would force plaintiffs to file class certification motions with the
complaint”).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
96. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
97. Mary Kay Kane, Standing, Mootness, and Federal Rule 23—Balancing Perspectives, 26
BUFF. L. REV. 83, 104 (1976).
98. 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:2, at 7–9.
99. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785, at
107 (2d ed. 1986).
100. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d
1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972); 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.85, at
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certification motion and to conduct discovery would help to ensure
accurate, well-drafted motions and to prevent certification of ill101
defined classes.
D. Hinging the Availability of the Class Action Device on Arbitrary
Timing
The nature of the alleged harm to the named plaintiffs and
members of the putative class is presumably no different before or
after the point at which the class certification motion is filed. As the
court recognized in Liles, allowing defendants to pick off plaintiffs
before certification, but not after, would nevertheless hinge the
102
availability of the class action device on this arbitrary point in time.
To be sure, rules that attach legal significance to arbitrary points in
time are not foreign to the American judicial system. The law
routinely assigns, for example, statutes of limitations to various types
of claims. At these arbitrary points in time, would-be plaintiffs who
have failed to assert their claims against defendants lose the right to
assert those claims. Of course, to the extent that would-be plaintiffs
have suffered harm, their injuries neither change nor disappear
merely because the statute of limitations runs. But for policy
reasons—namely, to mark for defendants a point in time at which
they can be certain that their past actions will not result in legal
ramifications—plaintiffs are stripped of their ability to sue.
No such policy considerations justify hinging the availability of
the class action device on whether a full offer was conveyed before or
after class certification. Allowing defendants to moot class actions
before certification does the direct opposite of granting certainty
about future legal ramifications. Rather than resolving the dispute
with all potential class members in a single action, the defendant, by
mooting a class action early in the process, leaves open the possibility

23-500.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1996–97); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350
(1978) (holding that the federal rules governing class actions authorize discovery on issues
relevant to certification); Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., 200 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (noting that defense tactics that force a plaintiff to file a motion of class certification with
the complaint also force the court to rule on the motion prior to any discovery).
101. See 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:2, at 6–7 (“The plaintiff should be diligent
in assuring that any class certification order issued by the trial court clearly sets forth and
describes the scope of the class with particularity. Such diligence assures that a proper litigation
framework will be set . . . .”).
102. Liles v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 452, 455 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
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103
that other plaintiffs will file similar suits down the line. The
defendant thus accomplishes nothing more than to guarantee the
uncertainty of future litigation.
It is true that the Supreme Court’s decisions have at times hinged
the independent legal status of a class on whether or not the court has
properly certified the class. In Sosna v. Iowa, for example, the Court
reasoned that it is the trial court’s answer to the question of whether
the putative class meets the requirements of Rule 23 that determines
whether or not the class can proceed notwithstanding the named
104
plaintiff’s mooted claim. If the answer is yes, the action can proceed;
105
if no, the action is moot. But allowing defendants deliberately to
moot class actions before certification would deny the district court
the very ability to reach the certification question—to make the
crucial determination on which the Sosna dichotomy hinges.106 If the
class is worthy of certification, and thus worthy of status distinct from
that of the named plaintiff, the trial court should at least be given the
chance to say so.107
In the end, the reason why defendants should be prevented from
mooting class actions by picking off named plaintiffs can be distilled
quite readily. Rule 23 makes available a mechanism that can be
employed once certain prerequisites are met. The practice of picking
off named plaintiffs nullifies that mechanism. To ensure that class

103. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (positing that the
practice of picking off named plainiffs would “invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating
successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement”).
104. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
105. See id. at 401 (“[A] case such as this, in which . . . the issue sought to be litigated
escapes full appellate review at the behest of any single challenger, does not inexorably become
moot by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs.”).
106. Consider this language from the Court’s opinion in Sosna:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is such
that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably be expected to
rule on a certification motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be said
to “relate back” to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of
the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue
would evade review.
Id. at 402 n.11 (emphasis added).
107. Some commentators have argued for a rule of “presumptive validity” to be applied to
class actions; that is, “an action commenced as a class action retains that character until a court
finds otherwise.” James A. Bledsoe, Jr., Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 430, 447 (1973) (quoting Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)); see
also 3B MOORE, supra note 100, ¶ 23.50, at 23-396 to -397 (2d ed. Supp. 1996–97) (“In the
interim between the commencement of the suit as a class action and the court’s determination
as to whether it may be so maintained, it should be treated as a class suit.”).
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actions, and all of the policy goals that they facilitate, remain
available for plaintiffs with qualifying claims, defendants must be
prevented from picking off named plaintiffs at the outset of class
actions.
IV. HOW DEFENDANTS CAN BE PREVENTED FROM PICKING OFF
NAMED PLAINTIFFS
The goal of preventing defendants from picking off named
plaintiffs at the outset of class actions can be effectuated in a number
of ways, ranging from tactical decisions about how to run the
litigation, to more theoretical revisions of Article III principles as
they apply in the class action context. This Part first discusses the
tactical approaches, concluding that while such approaches may be
successful on a case-by-case basis, they represent nothing more than
quick fixes—mere Band-Aids on the deeper wounds inflicted by the
practice of picking off named plaintiffs. Second, this Part briefly
surveys other, more theoretical approaches advanced by scholars
attempting to solve the problems associated with picking off named
plaintiffs. Unsatisfied that these scholars’ approaches represent the
best solution to the problem, this Part concludes by advancing a new
theory. This theory calls for application of the “inherently transitory”
principle from the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin108 to cases in which defendants attempt to forestall class
action litigation by picking off named plaintiffs.
A. Tactical Approaches
1. Substituting Another Named Plaintiff. As Part I.B discussed,
Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff with a
personal stake in the dispute be present at all times in the litigation.109
Absent a plaintiff with a personal stake, the litigation ceases to be
adversarial and must be dismissed as moot.110 If the named plaintiff in
a putative class action receives a full offer of judgment from the
defendant, and thereby loses her personal stake in the litigation, it
might seem like a logical solution simply to find another named

108. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
109. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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111
plaintiff to substitute. Yet while substituting a new plaintiff seems to
be a quick and easy fix, some courts have made class certification a
prerequisite to substitution of a new named plaintiff in place of one
whose claim has been rendered moot.112 Thus, if the named plaintiff is
picked off before the class is certified, substitution of a new named
113
plaintiff would not be permitted and the action would be dismissed.
The attorneys for the class would then be forced to find another
named plaintiff and to file the action anew.114 Cases might arise, also,
where it is difficult and time-consuming to find another named
plaintiff, resulting in delay and expense, and contravening the class
action device’s goal of efficiency. Further, filing individual actions
seriatim completely belies the central, efficient purpose behind class
actions—that of resolving the similar claims of numerous plaintiffs in
a single action.

2. Filing the Class Certification Motion Concurrently with the
Complaint. Another quick fix is to file the class certification motion
concurrently with the complaint. As most courts are unwilling, after
the certification motion has been filed, to dismiss an entire class
action solely by virtue of the fact that the named plaintiff’s claim has
become moot,115 plaintiffs can prevent defendants from thwarting
class action litigation by filing the certification motion when they
initiate the action.116 Such a tactic, however, as Part II.C discussed,117
would be contrary to sound judicial administration. Immediate filing
of class certification motions is not contemplated by either Rule 23 or
related local rules.118 Filing the complaint and class certification
motion concurrently would restrict the information available to
111. See Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reviewing the district court’s decision ordering, inter alia, that another plaintiff be substituted in
lieu of a plaintiff whose claim had been rendered moot).
112. See, e.g., Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 432 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (setting forth
two conditions for the substitution of a new named plaintiff: (1) “that the suit had been certified
as a class action,” and (2) “that at least one of these unnamed class members had standing”).
113. See id. (implying that failure to meet either of the two listed conditions would
necessitate dismissing the action as moot).
114. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 116.
115. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., 200 F.R.D. 399, 401 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(“One thing is certain: if defendant is successful in its use of Rule 68 in this case, few class action
complaints will be filed in this district in the future without accompanying class certification
motions.”).
117. See supra notes 93–101 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs to that which is available at the time of filing, potentially
limiting a plaintiff’s ability to define the nature and boundaries of the
119
putative class with precision. Moreover, as a federal judge recently
observed, such preemptive certification motions “would force
defendants to brief the motion and the court to rule on it prior to any
discovery and prior to any opportunity on the part of the parties to
address settlement in a meaningful way.”120 To be sure, in some cases
the plaintiff would have no trouble drafting a precise class
certification motion to be filed when the action is initiated. But in
other cases, where additional information obtained through discovery
would facilitate the more precise crafting of class certification
motions, the goals of efficiency inherent in class actions call for a
better solution than this quick fix.
B. Approaches Advanced by Commentators
Several commentators have eschewed the quick fixes discussed in
Section IV.A, advocating instead for “a serious redefinition of the
justiciability of class actions.”121 For example, one commentator
suggests that the status of the named plaintiff should be completely
122
ignored during the standing-mootness inquiry. Instead, the court
should concern itself only with whether the members of the putative
class—if they were actually present in court—would have standing to
sue the defendant.123 This theory is bold and drastic. Although it
would certainly quell the problems arising from the practice of
picking off named plaintiffs, it would also require the wholesale
disposal of basic class action principles—most prominently, the
principle that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.”124

119. See 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 7:2, at 6–7.
120. Asch, 200 F.R.D. at 400–01 (citing “pressure from the Civil Justice Reform Act to rule
on motions in no more than six months from filing” as generally prohibitive of class discovery
under such circumstances).
121. Greenstein, supra note 19, at 926; see infra notes 122–123, 125–127, and accompanying
text.
122. Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1659 (1981).
A similar argument for completely removing the class representative from the equation was
advanced in Greenstein, supra note 19, at 898 (“[T]he claims of a class present an article III
controversy, independent of the individual claims of the class representative, from the moment
the complaint is filed as a class action.”).
123. Class Standing and the Class Representative, supra note 122, at 1649–50.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
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Another commentator suggests a novel, more flexible, and
certainly progressive approach to the mootness inquiry, arguing that
courts should examine, on a case-by-case basis, the claims of plaintiffs
that have become moot, to determine if the policies behind the
mootness doctrine—preserving separation of powers, concrete
adversity between plaintiff and defendant, and vigorous advocacy by
125
each party—would be advanced by dismissing the entire action.
While, again, such a theory would prevent defendants from thwarting
most legitimate class actions, the case-by-case inquiry advocated by
the commentator would do little to provide certainty to plaintiffs and
defendants as to which types of class actions would survive a full offer
of judgment, and which would not. There is the potential, also, that
the courts would be overburdened in conducting such a nuanced
analysis in each case.
Still another commentator advocates a decidedly more measured
approach. Under this approach, if the named plaintiff files a class
certification motion at any time within the ten-day pendency of the
126
Rule 68 offer, the court should entertain the motion regardless of
whether the offer technically moots the individual claim of the named
127
plaintiff. This approach requires far less of a departure from
traditional class action principles than do the previous two examples.
It does not completely ignore the status of the named plaintiff;
instead, it hinges the availability of the class action device on the
actions of the named plaintiff, in accordance with the representational
nature of the class action device.128 To be sure, this approach attempts
to strike a reasonable compromise between traditional Article III
principles and the pragmatism necessary to prevent defendants from
nullifying the class action device.129 However, from a practical
125. Kenneth H. Leggett, Note, Article III Justiciability and Class Actions: Standing and
Mootness, 59 TEX. L. REV. 297, 322 (1981).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (“If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter
judgment.”).
127. Fisher, supra note 5, at 115–16.
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
129. Indeed, several courts have embraced and applied this theory. See, e.g., Kremnitzer v.
Cabrera & Rephen, P.C., 202 F.R.D. 239, 243 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff need only
seek, not receive, class certification during the ten-day period in order to suspend a Rule 68
offer, because class certification, if granted, would materially change the litigation so as to
extinguish the offer); Gibson v. Aman Collection Serv., Inc., No. 00-1798-CT/G, 2001 WL
849525, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 23, 2001) (agreeing that allowing motions for class certification
during the pendency of a Rule 68 offer restores Rule 68 to the role of facilitating and
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standpoint, this approach only buys named plaintiffs ten extra days in
which hurriedly to draft a class certification motion so as to survive a
defendant’s attempt to moot the entire class action. Although giving
named plaintiffs ten days is certainly better than requiring them to
file the certification motion concurrently with the complaint, this
approach does little to rectify the problems associated with hurriedly
drafted, “preemptive” (or, under this approach, “defensive”) class
130
certification motions. Moreover, from a constitutional standpoint,
there would still exist a short period during which the federal court
would technically lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case—the
period between the filing of the defendant’s Rule 68 offer, which
presumably moots the named plaintiff’s claim, and the filing of the
plaintiff’s certification motion. This approach fails to articulate a
theory under which the court could maintain jurisdiction throughout
the dispute without violating fundamental Article III principles. In an
attempt to fill this gap, the next Section advances just such a theory.
C. Advancing a New Theory: Application of the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Riverside
Recall from Part I.B131 the Supreme Court’s decision in County of
132
Riverside v. McLaughlin. In Riverside, the Court held that putative
class actions may continue after the named plaintiff’s claim becomes
moot if the named plaintiff’s claim is “so inherently transitory that the
trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for
class certification before the proposed representative’s individual
interest expires.”133 To highlight the applicability—or, potentially, the
inapplicability—of Riverside to the practice of picking off named
plaintiffs, a close examination of its facts is necessary. In Riverside,
the Court addressed Fourth Amendment challenges to the manner in
which Riverside County, California, provided probable cause
determinations to citizens who were arrested and temporarily held in
custody without a warrant.134 The named plaintiff, Donald Lee
encouraging settlements); Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, 200 F.R.D. 399, 400–01 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (declaring that a motion for class certification made during the pendency of a Rule 68
offer precludes a plaintiff from accepting an individual settlement).
130. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
132. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
133. Id. at 52 (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980))
(emphasis added).
134. Id. at 47.
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McLaughlin, filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, arguing that the County deprived him and
others of Fourth Amendment rights by holding them in custody
135
without promptly granting probable cause determinations.
McLaughlin alleged that the County’s practices resulted in delays of
up to ten days before probable cause was determined, during which
136
time citizens were held in custody without a warrant. This practice,
argued McLaughlin, violated certain Fourth Amendment rights that
137
had been articulated by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh —rights that
guaranteed “prompt” determinations of probable cause as a
prerequisite to holding citizens in custody without a warrant.138
Before attacking McLaughlin’s claim on the merits, the County
argued as a threshold issue that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction when it entertained and granted McLaughlin’s
motion for class certification, because the passage of time had
rendered McLaughlin’s claim moot.139 Although McLaughlin had filed
the class action complaint while he was being held in custody without
140
a warrant, the County argued that McLaughlin was no longer being
held in custody and that any constitutional violation under Gerstein
141
had ended. Further, the County argued that because McLaughlin
could not prove that he was likely to be subjected to the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct again, his claim was not one capable of
repetition yet evading review.142
The Court rejected the County’s arguments. Conceding that the
passage of time had rendered McLaughlin’s claim moot, the Court
nonetheless held that the district court had properly entertained and
143
First, the Court
granted the motion for class certification.
recognized that McLaughlin had filed his complaint while he was
144
being subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Then, the
135. Id. at 48. Three additional named plaintiffs with identical claims were added later in the
litigation. Id. at 49. For simplicity, only McLaughlin’s claim is discussed here.
136. Id. at 47–48.
137. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
138. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 47. Such determinations have become known as “Gerstein
hearings.” See, e.g., Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1999) (employing this
terminology).
139. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 50–51.
140. Id. at 48.
141. Id. at 50.
142. Id. at 48.
143. Id. at 52.
144. Id. at 51.
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Court observed that McLaughlin’s claim was “so inherently transitory
that the trial court [would] not have [had] even enough time to rule
on a motion for class certification before the proposed
145
representative’s individual interest expire[d].” The Court concluded
that motions for class certification in cases involving such “inherently
transitory” claims could, for jurisdictional purposes, relate back to the
time of filing the complaint, so as to allow the district court to
entertain the class certification motion notwithstanding the named
plaintiff’s expired claim.146
Although the Riverside decision establishes that, under some
circumstances, the trial court may entertain class certification motions
even if the named plaintiff’s claim has become moot, Riverside is
distinguishable from cases in which defendants affirmatively pick off
named plaintiffs. In Riverside, the named plaintiffs’ claims were
“inherently transitory”—that is, transitory by their very nature.
Donald Lee McLaughlin would have been released from pretrial
confinement within a short period of time, thereby rendering his
claim moot, regardless of what the defendant chose to do. In contrast,
cases in which named plaintiffs are picked off by defendants’ offers of
judgment do not necessarily involve claims that are “inherently
transitory.” Instead, most claims brought by these plaintiffs are
transitory only by virtue of the calculated actions of the defendants.
Absent the full offers of judgment from the defendants, the named
plaintiffs’ claims would not typically expire so quickly “that the trial
court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class
147
Thus, the facts of Riverside are technically
certification.”
distinguishable from cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims are rendered
“transitory” only by the defendants’ willingness to pick them off.
The central theory advanced by this Note is that the factual
distinctions between Riverside and those cases in which defendants
attempt to pick off named plaintiffs should not be dispositive. In
Riverside, the Court refused to deprive plaintiffs of the ability to
employ the class action device solely because the plaintiffs’ claims, by
no fault of the plaintiffs, were inherently transitory. Similarly, when
defendants evince their willingness to thwart the class action device
by conveying full offers of judgment at the outset of class actions, the
named plaintiffs’ claims are rendered transitory by no fault of the
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 52 (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980)).
Id.
Id. at 52 (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399) (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs, such that “the trial court [lacks] even enough time to rule
on a motion for class certification before the proposed
148
representative’s individual interest expires.” Thus, in keeping with
the Court’s decision in Riverside, the named plaintiff’s class
certification motion should be permitted, for jurisdictional purposes,
to relate back to the time at which the complaint was filed.149
This theory would prevent defendants from thwarting class
action litigation by settling with individual plaintiffs ad infinitum, and
it would resolve the concerns associated with previous theories
150
advanced by commentators. By grounding itself in the reasoning of
the Riverside decision, this theory does not run afoul of traditional
Article III principles. Further, this theory would not force named
plaintiffs hurriedly to draft a class certification motion within the tenday pendency of a Rule 68 offer, nor, worse, would it force them to
file the certification motion concurrently with the complaint. Rather,
it would enable willing named plaintiffs to employ the class action
device as it was intended to be employed—to resolve the similar
claims of numerous plaintiffs in a single action.
The only remaining concern associated with the instant theory is
that named plaintiffs, having received full compensation from the
defendant, will lack motivation to represent the class vigorously
during the remainder of the litigation. One of the purposes behind
Article III’s case or controversy requirement is to ensure vigorous
advocacy by both parties, on the assumption that vigorous advocacy
151
leads to clearer distillations of the truth. In the context of the theory
here advanced, however, this concern lacks traction. Unmotivated
named plaintiffs—those who simply leverage the class action device
for better posture in settling their individual claims and are
ambivalent about pursuing claims on behalf of putative class
members—would have no reason to continue pursuing class
certification once their individual claims have been settled; the case,
thereafter, would be dropped. Only named plaintiffs with more
sincere motivations—motivations that are broader than merely
148. Id.
149. Id. (“In such cases, the ‘relation back’ doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the
merits of the case for judicial resolution.”).
150. See supra Part IV.B.
151. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he purpose of the ‘personal stake’ requirement is to
assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. The imperatives of a dispute
capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and selfinterested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.”).
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152
resolving their individual claims —would continue to pursue class
certification after receiving a settlement offer from the defendant.
Prosecution of the putative class members’ claims, then, would
remain in the hands of named plaintiffs who would vigorously
represent the class.

CONCLUSION
The practice of successively picking off named plaintiffs at the
outset of class actions is more than just a tactic employed by cunning
defendants to thwart class action litigation. It represents a threat to
the ability of some persons to gain access to the judicial system, and
denies others the ability to collaborate toward the goal of effecting
broad social change. This Note has set forth a new theory under
which federal courts can prevent defendants from picking off named
plaintiffs, thereby ensuring that the class action device remains
available to those plaintiffs whose claims meet the prerequisites of
Rule 23. By applying the principles of the Supreme Court’s Riverside
decision to cases in which defendants’ strategic conduct serves to
render named plaintiffs’ claims “transitory,” courts can effectuate the
purpose and policies of the class action device, and ensure that Rule
23 is “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.”153

152.
153.

See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

